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Secondary household transmission of severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS) was studied in 114 house-
holds involving 417 contacts. The attack rate was low
(6.2%). Occupation of the index case was the factor that
most influenced household transmission (adjusted hazard
ratio for healthcare workers 0.157; 95% confidence interval
0.042 to 0.588). 
S
evere acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is an emerg-
ing infectious disease caused by the SARS-associated
coronavirus (SARS-CoV) (1). Attack rates are >50% in
hospitals (2). A similar trend was seen in Singapore, with
SARS spreading to five hospitals and two Specialty
Centres within 8 weeks (3). This rapid rate of transmission
caused a national health alert and resulted in large amounts
of manpower and resources being deployed.
On the other hand, transmission within the household
was less efficient. We, therefore, examined the attack rate
and the factors influencing secondary transmission of
SARS in Singapore households. Data on probable SARS
cases were collected by Singapore’s Ministry of Health
Epidemiology Unit, Singapore. The case definition of
probable SARS was in accordance with the World Health
Organization (WHO) (4). 
Probable SARS cases that were also a household index
were identified by using the definition that follow. A
household was defined as a residential place with a unique
address. A household index was a person with probable
SARS and the first person to introduce SARS into the
household. A household contact was defined as a person
living in the same household as the household index. 
Demographic and clinical data were collected. For the
household index, the following information was collected:
age, sex, if the household index was a healthcare worker
(defined as a person who works in a healthcare setting),
number of days spent at home after onset of symptoms,
and number of contacts in household. For household con-
tacts, the following information was collected: age, sex, if
the contact was a healthcare worker, and if the contact was
a family member. The week of the SARS outbreak in
Singapore was also evaluated to see if there was a time
trend in the risk for transmission. 
All household contacts were followed prospectively for
(1) clinical symptoms until 20 days after the last contact
with the household index, and (2) evidence of positive
PCR (polymerase chain reaction) or serologic test for
SARS-CoV (according to criteria set by WHO). Secondary
household transmission was said to have occurred if the
household contact fulfilled the case definition of probable
SARS (4). 
Households were excluded if the household index lived
alone, the household index did not spend time at home
after onset of symptoms, if the period of household  expo-
sure to the index was not clearly defined (e.g., not isolated
promptly upon hospital admission), or more than one
index lived in the household (shown through contact trac-
ing or onset <2 days after SARS developed in the first per-
son in the household).
Statistical tests (Mann-Whitney, chi-square and Fisher
exact test) were used to test for associations when appro-
priate. The Cox regression model was used to evaluate the
influence of demographic and clinical factors on second-
ary household transmission. All analyses were performed
with SPSS version 11.5.
There were 205 probable SARS cases in Singapore dur-
ing the period between February 24 and April 29, 2003.
These 205 probable SARS cases resided in 163 house-
holds. Atotal of 114 households fulfilled the inclusion and
exclusion criteria. Forty-nine households were excluded
(12 because the index lived alone, 20 because the house-
hold index did not spend time at home after onset of symp-
toms, 10 because the period of household exposure to the
index was not clearly defined, 7 because more than one
index patient was in that household). Seventy-two of the
114 household indexes (63.2%) were healthcare workers.
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and 21 were paramedical staff. 
From these 114 households, 417 household contacts
were identified and followed prospectively. Secondary
transmission occurred in only 14 households (12.3%), giv-
ing rise to 26 household cases of probable SARS.
Household transmissions occurred within 2–11 days (mean
5.3 ± 2.6 days) after the onset of symptoms in the index
cases. Symptoms developed in eight contacts (30%) while
on home quarantine orders. The remaining 18 were not
given home quarantine orders because they were either
already in hospital with SARS or were not identified by
contact tracing. The mean length of stay at home after
onset of symptoms was not statistically different between
the home-quarantined group and the group not quarantined
at home (p = 0.09). 
The secondary household attack rate was thus low
(6.2% [95% confidence interval 3.9% to 8.6%]) and con-
curs with that reported by Beijing, China (5). In that study,
the attack rate was 4.6% in persons who had contact with a
probable SARS case-patient during the symptomatic period
and lived in the same residence (which included some per-
sons who visited or cared for a SARS patient). These find-
ings are in contrast to the high attack rate seen in the health-
care setting (6). One possible explanation for this difference
is the phase of the illness. SARS case-patients in the house-
hold tend to be in the early phase of illness whereas SARS
case-patients in the healthcare settings tend to be in the later
phase. In addition, coexisting conditions and invasive pro-
cedures done within the hospital setting may also influence
risk of transmitting disease (7).
The low rate of household transmission suggests that
the magnitude of a household outbreak would be less than
a hospital-based one, which could help allay public fear
and panic, a societal concern evident in the recent outbreak
(2,7). This knowledge will also enable public health offi-
cers to develop a more sensitive and responsive surveil-
lance system. As the expected attack rate is known, health-
care professionals can be prepared early if the observed
attack rate in the households is higher than predicted,
allowing rational rather than empirical implementation of
public health measures and justify rapid and aggressive
investigative and containment measures needed to prevent
a large outbreak. These considerations are particularly
important for countries with limited healthcare and fiscal
resources. In Singapore, we learned the usefulness of edu-
cating persons on the need and means of doing daily tem-
perature monitoring, to have a centralized temperature
recording database for hospital staff and patients so that a
cluster of fevers could be spotted early, to evaluate symp-
tomatic hospital staff in designated hospital clinics, and to
trace contacts by using many resources including the
police and army. The authorities in Hong Kong did not
have the benefit of this information as little was known
then about SARS. Perhaps in the future, such knowledge
will help prevent another situation similar to that seen in
Amoy Gardens, Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region (8).
Factors influencing household transmission were also
studied in the Singapore cohort. Univariate analysis (Table
1) showed that household index cases were less likely to
transmit SARS to their household contacts if they were
younger or were healthcare workers. Contacts were more
likely to develop SARS if they were family members or
nonhealthcare workers. The Cox regression model (Figure
and Table 2) verified two of these four factors, index occu-
pation and age. 
The most consistent and important factor influencing
household transmission was whether or not the index case
was a healthcare worker (adjusted hazard ratio 0.157; 95%
CI 0.042 to 0.588). This was independent of length of
exposure or demographics. The reason for this finding was
not evident from the data available. A difference in social
behavior between healthcare worker and nonhealthcare
worker is a possible explanation for this disparity in risks
of household transmission. For example, healthcare work-
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Table 1. Characteristics of household contacts and index cases
a 
Risk Factor 
Household  contacts with SARS 
(n = 26) (mean ± 1 SD) 
Household  contacts without SARS 
(n = 391) (mean ± 1 SD)  p value 
Household  contact       
Age (y)  35.3 ± 19.8  30.3 ± 17.4  0.17 
Sex (female)  14 (53.8%)  225 (57.5%)  0.71 
Healthcare worker  1 (3.8%)  84 (21.5%)  0.04 
Family member  24 (92.3%)  269 (68.8%)  0.01 
Index case       
Age (y)  53.5 ± 16.2  35.4 ± 13.6  <0.001 
Sex (female)  20 (76.9%)  290 (74.2%)  0.76 
Healthcare worker  4 (15.4%)  273 (69.8%)  <0.001 
Days index spent at home after 
onset of symptoms  5.3 ± 2.5  4.8 ± 2.5  0.43 
No. of persons in household  5.0 ± 3.0  4.8 ± 2.4  0.79 
aUsing univariate analysis, SARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome. ers may be more acutely aware of the risk of acquiring and
transmitting SARS and may alter hygiene practices at
home. In addition, better health and disease prevention
knowledge may influence the efficacy of such practices.
Qualitative differences in social behavior between health-
care worker and nonhealthcare worker should be investi-
gated, as this knowledge may be useful in containing
future SARS outbreaks.
The risk for household transmission was also lower if
the index case was younger. This finding may correlate
with milder disease seen in younger persons and lower
infectivity. The week of the outbreak did not significantly
influence the model, indicating the lack of a time trend in
household transmission. 
In conclusion, this study is the first to characterize sec-
ondary household transmission of SARS. We have shown
that the attack rate is low and the most significant factor
influencing household transmission was the occupation of
the index case. The results of this study challenge some of
the current concepts about SARS. Given that the study
numbers are not large, a multicenter analysis of the past
SARS cases would be helpful in verifying these findings. 
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Figure. Survival analysis for secondary household transmission
(Cox regression model). Household contacts were more likely to
get SARS if the index was older or a nonhealthcare worker.
Hazard ratios of risk factors analyzed are tabulated in Table 2. The
-2log likelihood for this analysis was 253.77. HH, household;
HCW, healthcare worker; NHCW, nonhealthcare worker.
Table 2. Hazard ratios of risk factors analyzed
a 
Independent risk factor  Hazard ratio (95% CI)  p value 
Household contact     
Age (yrs)  1.013 (0.992 to 1.034)  0.222 
Sex (female)  1.232 (0.542 to 2.796)  0.619 
Healthcare worker  1.692 (0.137 to 20.926)  0.682 
Family member  1.936 (0.372 to 10.076)  0.432 
Household index     
Age (y)  1.055 (1.015 to 1.097)  0.007 
Sex (female)  1.274 (0.451 to 3.595)  0.648 
Healthcare worker  0.157 (0.042 to 0.588)  0.006 
Days index spent at home 
after onset of symptoms 
0.942 (0.794 to 1.117)  0.493 
No. of persons in household   1.060 (0.899 to 1.249)  0.490 
Week of outbreak  1.019 (0.733 to 1.417)  0.911 
a Using Cox Regression Model; CI, confidence interval. 
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